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Among the recent financial problems of Harvard University, those of its law 
school are particularly onerous, because the recession of 2008–09 caught the 
school in the middle of a large building project, forcing it to continue to spend 
heavily while the value and income of its endowment declined dramatically.1 
This present difficulty makes an examination of the impoverishment of Harvard 
Law School (HLS) that occurred a century ago particularly intriguing. The 
financial collapse during the administration of Dean James Barr Ames (1846–
1910) has been overlooked by scholars,2 but had a profound impact on the 
school by depriving it of resources needed for continued development and 
undermining its position at the time as “the greatest law school in the world.”3 
While struggling to recover from the financial disaster over the next four 
decades, HLS lost what had appeared in 1900 to be an unassailable position 
of leadership and fell back into the pack of other leading law schools at major 
universities. This result demonstrates the prescience of the statement made in 
1906 by Harvard University President Charles W. Eliot: “In the competition 
1. Harvard Law School, Endowment Projections Force Budget Cuts, Harvard Law Today, 
July 2009, at 2; Layoffs at Harvard Rattle Law School, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, July 
6 2009.
2. Shoshana Stern, “The Good Dean”: James Barr Ames, Man of Mystery (Spring 2006) 
(unpublished term paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with Daniel R. Coquillette); 
Charles E. Loeffler and Daniel R. Coquillette, James Barr Ames (1846-1910) in Universal 
Jurists, 4 vols. (Rafael Domingo ed., Marcial Pons 2005).
3. William H. Taft, Oration in Harvard Law School Association, Report of the Eighteenth 
Annual Meeting, 15 (Harvard Law School Association 1904).
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7between American universities, and between American and foreign universities, 
those universities will inevitably win which have the largest amounts of free 
money,” that is, unrestricted cash funds.4 HLS essentially squandered its “free 
money” during the administration of Dean Ames from 1895 to 1909, leaving it 
destitute and unable to recover for a number of complicated reasons until the 
1960s.
This outcome entailed several profound ironies. HLS impoverished itself 
by violating the path-breaking financial policies of President Eliot (1834–1926) 
who, during his administration from 1869 to 1909, laid the foundation for the 
university’s subsequent financial preeminence. Why did “the most successful 
of the university’s professional schools,” in Eliot’s words,5 ignore his own far-
sighted financial policies that brought prosperity to those other schools, and 
why did Eliot permit, even encourage, the law school to do so? Secondly, 
Eliot, Ames, and the HLS faculty and alumni continued to think of HLS as 
the most successful professional school at Harvard or “in our country or in 
the world,”6 even though the finances of HLS had deteriorated below those 
of other Harvard professional schools by the time Ames and Eliot stepped 
down in 1909. Finally, and most remarkably, HLS failed in its efforts to recover 
financially precisely because it was widely viewed at Harvard as enormously 
successful and prosperous, and the school found it difficult to convince 
everyone—including itself—that it needed help.
I.
By the end of the 19th century, HLS had achieved unquestioned preeminence 
among law schools in the United States. The school attained this leading 
position, on the one hand, because, during his administration from 1870 to 
1895, HLS Dean Christopher C. Langdell (1826–1906) established the model of 
academic meritocracy that would proliferate throughout legal and professional 
education over the next century.7 That model incorporated the admissions 
requirement of a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, the sequenced curriculum 
and its extension to three years, the inductive pedagogy of teaching from cases, 
the hurdle of written examinations for continuation and graduation, the written 
examination posing hypothetical problems, the program of study leading to 
academic honor, the independent career track for faculty, the transformation 
of the library from a textbook dispensary to a resource for scholarship, and 
the national alumni association actively supporting the school. On the other 
4. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President 1905–06, 54–55 (Harvard Univ. 1907). 
Annual reports of the presidents, treasurers, and deans of Harvard were published each 
year by the university and are cited below as “Annual Report” with the corresponding year 
noted.
5. Charles W. Eliot, Address, in Harvard Law School Association, Report of the Eighteenth 
Annual Meeting, 68 (Harvard Law School Association 1904).
6. Id.
7. See Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C. C. Langdell, 
1826–1906 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 2009).
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hand, Langdell instituted a new successful financial strategy for professional 
education, maintaining that a professional school devoted to academic merit 
would prosper because higher standards would produce better graduates who 
would be more marketable, making the school more attractive to prospective 
students.
As a result, HLS maintained the highest academic standards for admission 
and graduation of any law school in the country, while at the same time 
increasing the enrollment and geographic range of its students beyond that 
of any counterpart. “The school, I am glad to say, grows year by year more 
national. This year 740 graduates come to us from more than 100 colleges…. 
Some 70 men, formerly students of this school, are now teaching law in other 
schools,” observed Ames in 1904.8 In the following year, the percentages of 
college graduates among students at leading university law schools were as 
follows: Harvard, 99 percent; Columbia, 82 percent; Chicago, 60 percent; Yale, 
35 percent; Pennsylvania, 35 percent; Northwestern, 31 percent; Michigan, 13 
percent; Cornell, 10 percent; and Illinois 7 percent.9 In 1909, HLS was “larger 
than at any previous time in its history,”10 and “reached its highest point in 
numbers and influence.”11 Furthermore, this expansion “both in the number 
of students and in the development of its library and material resources…
was attained in spite of the requirement of a college degree as a condition 
for admission to regular standing, and in spite of other stringent regulations 
designed to maintain a high standing.”12 In fact, the increase in enrollment and 
in academic standards were not in tension but mutually reinforcing, because 
“the cause of the remarkable development of the school since 1870–71” lay in 
“the spreading confidence in our standards and methods as illustrated by our 
graduates.”13 Consequently, “the school is now larger than at any previous 
time in its history, in spite, or in consequence, of the raising of its standards,” 
observed President A. Lawrence Lowell, soon after succeeding Eliot in 1909.14
Testimony to the school’s preeminence was abundant. In 1898, the famous 
Oxford legal scholar Albert V. Dicey asserted, “Harvard is quite ahead of 
the universities of the U.S.…and the law school is their greatest triumph,” 
8. James B. Ames, Address, in Harvard Law School Association, Report of the Eighteenth 
Annual Meeting, 70–71 (Harvard Law School Association 1904). See Charles W. Eliot, 
Annual Report 1904–05, 39 (Harvard Univ. 1906).
9. Eliot, supra note 8, at 39.
10. A. Lawrence Lowell, Annual Report of the President 1909–10, 16 (Harvard Univ. 1911).
11. Samuel Williston, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1908–09, 164 (Harvard 
Univ. 1910).
12. Ezra R. Thayer, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1909–10, 136 (Harvard Univ. 
1911).
13. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1902–03, 20–21 (Harvard Univ. 1904). Eliot misquotes 
James B. Ames, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1902–03, 168.
14. Lowell, supra note 10, at 16.
9and recommended importing the HLS system into England.15 The 1903 
report of the Harvard Overseers Visiting Committee assigned to assess the 
law school, observed, “It is almost needless for the Committee to say that the 
legal education given at the Harvard Law School is the best ever given either 
in England or America…and the school, as a whole, is today the model for 
law schools throughout the country.”16 In 1904, non-alumnus and future U.S. 
President and Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Taft called HLS “the 
greatest law school in the world,”17 confirming the view of President Eliot, who 
was not given to extravagant praise: “If there be a more successful school in 
our country or in the world for any profession, I can only say that I do not 
know where it is. The school seems to have reached the climax of success in 
professional education.”18
Commensurate with the rise of its prestige, influence, and enrollment, HLS 
became wealthy. Initially, the great majority of students, alumni, and local 
lawyers opposed Langdell’s introduction of the academic meritocratic model, 
and the enrollment at HLS dropped precipitously at several points during the 
1870s, causing revenue to fall dramatically due to the school’s heavy reliance 
on tuition.19 But in the early 1880s, the school received three significant gifts 
for a new building, an endowed professorship, and a fund to purchase books, 
and in the mid-1880s enrollment began to climb rapidly and continued to grow 
through the last ten years of Ames’s deanship.20 From 132 students in 1870–71, 
the enrollment surpassed 400 for the first time in 1892–93, then 500 in 1897–98, 
600 in 1899–1900, 700 in 1903–04, and 800 in 1911–12.21 Already in 1887, Eliot 
announced publicly, “the law school is now in a position of great strength.”22 
Ten years later, trying to recruit a new faculty member, he observed, “The 
15. A. V. Dicey to Elinor M. Dicey (13–14 Nov. 1898), quoted in Memorials of Albert Venn Dicey, 
164 (Robert S. Rait ed., MacMillan 1925).
16. Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Apr. 8, 1903), Reports 
of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, (on file with Harvard 
University Archives), v. 1b, 720–21. 
17. Taft, supra note 3, at 15.
18. Eliot, supra note 5, at 68.
19. See Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1880–81, 26–27 (Harvard Univ. 1882); Charles W. Eliot, 
Annual Report 1883–84, 34 (Harvard Univ. 1885); The Centennial History of the Harvard 
Law School, 1817–1917 39 (Harvard Law School Ass’n 1918); Letter from Charles W. Eliot to 
William C. Lane (Oct. 2, 1922) (Charles W. Eliot Papers, Harvard Univ. Archives, box 68, 
f. 1874 A-G). Citations to Eliot’s papers in the Harvard Univ. Archives follow the pre-2006 
citation system. 
20. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1881–82, 26–27, 30 (Harvard Univ. 1883); Charles W. Eliot, 
Annual Report 1884–85, 54 (Harvard Univ. 1886); Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1889–90, 
24 (Harvard Univ. 1891); Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, 25 (Harvard Univ. 1898).
21. James B. Ames, Annual Report 1905–06, 163 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Ezra R. Thayer, Annual 
Report 1910–11, 131 (Harvard Univ. 1912).
22. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1885–86, 13 (Harvard Univ. 1887).
The Financial Collapse of Harvard Law School
10	 Journal of Legal Education
pecuniary condition of the law school is distinctly prosperous. It has had a 
large surplus for several years past.”23 Indeed, beginning in 1886–87 the annual 
surplus began to grow ever larger:
  Annual Surplus  
 Year of HLS (dollars)24
1886-87 2,850
1887-88 8,291
1888-89 6,525
1889-90 12,193
1890-91 11,635
1891-92 18,314
1892-93 16,355
1893-94 13,666
1894-95 27,046
1895-96 24,089
1896-97 10,615
1897-98 33,107
1898-99 27,547
1899-00 32,963
1900-01 33,529
1901-02 42,346
1902-03 33,550
1903-04 48,761
1904-05 44,119
1905-06 49,448 
As a result, HLS accumulated an enormous cash reserve. It is difficult to 
calculate the exact total at any given time because certain gifts and other funds 
for current use were received, carried, and then expended at various points. 
Nevertheless, the overall trajectory was a rapid ascent “owing chiefly to more 
tuition fees,”25 as enrollment grew. In 1895, Eliot put the surplus at $112,004 and 
23. Charles W. Eliot to Blewett Lee (Mar. 13, 1897), Charles W. Eliot Papers, (Harvard Univ. 
Archives, box 91, letterbook, 1889–98, leaves 167a–168).
24. Winthrop H. Wade, Twenty Years of the Harvard Law School Association, 8 (Harvard 
Graduates’ Magazine 1907). Dollar amounts are from the year listed.
25. Annual Report of the Treasurer of Harvard University 1889–90, 5 (Harvard Univ. 1891).
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two years later at $133,000.26 At the high point in about 1906, the unrestricted 
cash reserves of the school approximated $498,000. This huge cache of “free 
money” was five times the annual budget of the school and exceeded the sum 
of all its endowed funds, totaling about $394,624.27 By comparison, Columbia 
University Law School, generally recognized as “the nation’s second best” law 
school at the time,28 lacked any significant cash reserves and was seeking gifts 
for a new building.29 At Yale, the law school became solvent in the 1890s and 
began to accrue endowment and to construct a new building, but it lacked the 
enrollment and tuition base of either Harvard or Columbia, as well as deep-
pocketed alumni in the financial centers of New York or Boston.30 Nor was the 
University of Chicago Law School yet a competitor, given that between 1902 
and 1904 it borrowed HLS Professor Joseph H. Beale to serve as founding 
dean and establish the HLS model there.31 At the beginning of the 20th 
century, therefore, the preeminence of HLS in academic standards, wealth, 
and prestige seemed insurmountable.
II.
With success came problems. Austin Hall, the new building completed in 
1883, had been expected to house the school for fifty years, but was already 
outgrown by 1891.32 Space was so constricted by September 1895 that the 1Ls 
had to line up several hours early to secure a classroom seat, and an embarrassed 
President Eliot appointed a committee “with full power to determine the 
mode of assigning seats to first-year students, it being understood that the 
formation of a line of students several hours before the assignment of seats 
should not be repeated.”33 By 1897, when the entering class numbered 209, 
26. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1894–95, 27 (Harvard Univ. 1896); Eliot to Lee, supra note 
23.
27. As of July 31, 1906, HLS had cash reserves of $347,742, a discretionary cash account 
designated for the use of the library of $100,000, and a cash surplus for the 1905–06 academic 
year of about $50,000, exclusive of gifts toward endowment of $116,250. Annual Report of 
the Treasurer 1905–06, 67, 102–103 (Harvard Univ. 1907).
28. Robert A. McCaughey. Stand, Columbia: A History of Columbia University in the City of 
New York, 1754–2004, 231 (Columbia Univ. Press 2003).
29. Julius Goebel, Jr., A History of the Law School of Columbia University, 186 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1955).
30. Frederick C. Hicks, History of the Yale Law School to 1915, 210–15 (Yale Univ. Press 1935); 
Brooks M. Kelley, Yale: A History, 276–77, 340–41 (Yale Univ. Press 1974); John H. Langbein, 
Law School in a University: Yale’s Distinctive Path in the Later Nineteenth Century, in 
History of Yale Law School, 60–61 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2004).
31. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1901–02, 44 (Harvard Univ. 1903); Letter from Joseph H. 
Beale to Charles W. Eliot (Oct. 27, 1903) Charles W. Eliot Papers, (Harvard Univ. Archives, 
box 274–275).
32. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1890–91, 19 (Harvard Univ. 1892). C. C. Langdell, Annual 
Report of the Dean of the Law School 1890–91, 114 (Harvard Univ. 1892). 
33. HLS Faculty, Minutes of Meetings, Harvard Law School Library Special Collections, 30 
Sep. 1896.
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it became evident to the president, the dean, and the Overseers Visiting 
Committee that “two costly improvements will need soon to be made for the 
law school. Its building will have to be enlarged, and the class of the first year 
will have to be divided into two sections.”34 Even though the faculty tightened 
standards for admission and continuation,35 enrollment continued to grow, 
and the president wrote in 1900, “An immediate enlargement of the building 
is imperatively demanded.”36
By 1904, Dean Ames maintained that the overcrowding was threatening the 
students’ work at HLS, because, apart from
the inadequacy of [library] stack, the lecture rooms, and professors’ rooms, 
and of the administration and cataloguing accommodations…the insufficient 
accommodations of the reading room are a serious menace to the effectiveness 
of the school. When the students numbered 400 or less, a large majority of 
them did the greater part of their work in Austin Hall. They were always sure 
of finding a seat at a table…. Being within easy reach of all the books, they 
formed the habit of consulting freely the authorities, and gained a familiarity 
with the reports and treatises…. Today the students, as a rule, do the greater 
part of their work in their own rooms. Many would prefer to work in Austin 
Hall, but the small seating accommodation makes it impossible to count 
upon obtaining a place at a table, and many students abandon the attempt 
to get one…a return to the former practice of making the reading room the 
chief place of work of the students is imperatively demanded, if the school is 
to maintain its high standard.37
In the meantime, planning for additional space had begun, but foundered 
on disagreements and delays. In winter and spring of 1898 the HLS faculty 
developed a plan for enlarging Austin Hall, and asked the Harvard Corporation 
to authorize the project. In fall 1899, the faculty again requested authorization, 
but the corporation balked, preferring a new building to an addition and citing 
the rising construction costs. In January 1901, a new faculty committee debated 
whether to enlarge Austin Hall or erect a new building and began consulting 
with architects.38 Eliot’s leave of absence during winter delayed progress until 
June, when he and the corporation endorsed architectural plans for a new 
building. During the last half of 1901, the faculty persuaded the corporation to 
34. Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, supra note 20, at 25. See James B. Ames, Annual Report 1896–
97, 162–63 (Harvard Univ. 1898); James B. Ames, Annual Report 1897–98, 162 (Harvard 
Univ. 1899); Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Apr. 13, 
1898), Reports of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, Harvard 
University Archives, v. 1a, 527–28.
35. HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Oct. 8, 1897; Nov. 17, 1897; Nov. 12, 1900.
36. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1899–1900, 17–18 (Harvard Univ. 1901).
37. James B. Ames, Annual Report 1903–04, 181 (Harvard Univ. 1905).
38. HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Feb. 24, 1898; Mar. 17, 1898; Nov. 6 & 13, 1899; Jan. 28, 1901. 
See also Feb. 1 & 18, 1901.
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enlarge Austin Hall instead, and during 1902 plans were drawn and contracts 
tendered, but construction was postponed again due to the high cost.39
Meanwhile, enrollment had stabilized so the faculty and the corporation 
decided in 1903 to shelve the project, over the protest of the Overseers Visiting 
Committee. Then a large increase in the entering class in fall 1903 prompted the 
faculty to urge that construction begin in the spring.40 During 1904, however, 
the corporation dug in its heels and refused to approve the addition to Austin 
Hall, thinking it insufficient; and in December, the faculty capitulated and 
agreed to an entirely new building.41 When plans were completed in June 
1905, the faculty asked the corporation to authorize the project immediately so 
the building “can be ready for use by the opening of the fall term of 1906,”42 
lest “a whole year will be lost.”43 But the corporation waited until fall 1905 to 
solicit bids and construction finally began in spring 1906.44 The structure was 
to be named in honor of Langdell, the only living professor to have a building 
named after him at Harvard.45
The decade of delays and consultations were frustrating to all concerned,46 
including, perhaps, Langdell, who died in July 1906 before Langdell Hall was 
opened. Yet, Eliot believed that the process had improved the final plan,47 
although many felt that the appearance of Langdell Hall did not harmonize 
with its surroundings.48 The aesthetic issue was significant because the edifice 
39. Letter from Charles W. Eliot to James B. Ames (Jun. 10, 1901) (Charles W. Eliot Papers, 
Harvard Univ. Archives, box 92, letterbook, 113); HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Jun. 22, 1901; 
Eliot, supra note 32, at 43–44.
40. Eliot, supra note 13, at 20; HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Dec. 24, 1903; Report, Overseers 
Standing Committee, supra note 16, at 719–20.
41. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1903–04, 25 (Harvard Univ. 1905); HLS Faculty, supra note 
33, at Dec. 12, 1904. But see HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Jan. 16, 1905.
42. Letter from Francis C. Lowell and Thomas N. Perkins, Committee of the Corporation 
on the Law School Building, Report to the Corporation (Jun. 22, 1905), Charles W. Eliot 
Papers (Harvard Univ. Archives, box 276–277). See Eliot, supra note 8, at 58.
43. Letter from Francis C. Lowell to Charles F. Adams (Jun. 22, 1905), Charles W. Eliot Papers 
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 276–277).
44. Eliot, supra note 8, at 39. See HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Oct. 3, 1905.
45. Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 34, at 527–28; Eugene Wambaugh, Langdell Hall 
and the Earlier Buildings of the Harvard Law School, in 20 The Green Bag, 302 (1908).
46. Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Feb. 28, 1906), Reports 
of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, Harvard University 
Archives, v. 1b, 883.
47.  Eliot, supra note 8, at 39.
48. Albert F. Veenfliet, Letters to his Family and Harvard Memorabilia,1902–09, Oct. 1, 1906 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library Special Collections); Austin W. Scott, Letters 
from a Law Student to his Family, 1906–1908, Oct. 4, 1906 (Harvard Law School 1974); 
James B. Ames, Annual Report 1906–07, 153 (Harvard Univ. 1908); Eliot, supra note 4, at 
26–27.
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was massive. Due to financial constraints, only three-fifths of Langdell Hall 
was erected at this time, yet even that fraction was twice as large as Austin 
Hall; and when completed, Langdell Hall was expected to “remain for many 
years one of the largest buildings in Cambridge.”49 Construction went on 
throughout the year 1906–07, and by the time the building was opened in 
October 1907,50 everyone had apparently tired of the project. Prompted as 
much by custom as enthusiasm, plans were made for a dedication ceremony, 
and Eliot invited A. V. Dicey to come from Oxford and give the dedication 
address. But when he declined, the initiative lost steam, and since there was 
no donor to honor, the event was cancelled. When the remaining two-fifths 
of the building was completed in 1929, a dedication was held, at which point 
Langdell scarcely received any mention.51
A significant reason for the ambivalence and 10-year delay in planning and 
building Langdell Hall was that the entire cost, amounting to about $400,000, 
was paid out of the unrestricted cash reserves of the school.52 Already in his 
annual report for 1896–97 President Eliot wrote that “fortunately the [tuition] 
earnings of the school are large enough” to cover the expense of a new 
building, and he repeated the point in 1900.53 In his 1898–99 report, Dean 
Ames stated without qualification, “The expense of the new building will be 
met wholly from the surplus earnings of the school.”54 Given this approach, 
there was no reason to rush the expenditure, and Eliot even noted that the 
delay in 1902 meant, “the annual surpluses of the school can be accumulated 
to cover the extra cost of the new building.”55 Conversely, the Overseers 
49. Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 305. See Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27.
50. Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27; Veenfliet, supra note 48, at Oct. 1, 1906; Ames, Annual Report, 
1906–07, supra note 48, at 153; Scott, supra note 48, at Oct. 4, 1906, Oct. 16, 1907, Jan. 8 1908; 
Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 302.
51. HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Feb. 21, 1907, Mar. 21, 1907, May 20 & 28, 1907, Jun. 22, 1907; 
Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Albert V. Dicey (May 28, 1907), Charles W. Eliot Papers, 
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 96, letterbook, 84); [Sarah R. Ames], Memoir of James Barr 
Ames, in James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1913); F. A. D. Atwood, Old Folks’ Day, New Boston, N.H., Jun. 13, 
1907, Thirteenth Reunion, 6n (John B. Clarke 1908).
52. The building itself cost about 365,000 dollars, and furnishings apparently ran another 35,000 
dollars. Annual Report of the Treasurer 1905–06, 10 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Annual Report of 
the Treasurer 1907–08, 14 (Harvard Univ. 1909); Annual Report of the Treasurer 1908–09, 12 
(Harvard Univ. 1910); Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 303-4; Francis Rawle, A Hundred Years 
of the Harvard Law School, 1817-1917, Harvard Graduates’ Magazine 26, Dec. 1817 at 186; 
Lowell to Adams, supra note 43.
53. Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, supra note 20, at 25. See Eliot, supra note 36, at 17–18.
54. James B. Ames, Annual Report 1898–99, 174 (Harvard Univ. 1900).
55. Eliot, supra note 31, at 44. 
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Visiting Committee argued that, since the money was in hand, construction 
could begin as soon as possible.56 In any case, the financing arrangement was 
widely known and publicized at the time.57
The depletion of its “free money” had significant consequences for HLS. 
First, it eliminated the reserves that could carry the school through difficult 
times without drastic cuts. For example, the Panic of 1907 caused other schools 
at Harvard to feel pinched.58 In addition, the loss of reserves made any decline 
in enrollment and tuition an immediate threat. Although the total enrollment 
of HLS was still strong and growing in 1904–05, the graduates of Harvard and 
other colleges had begun to exhibit a worrisome shift away from enrolling in 
law school toward entering business.59 In the late 1910s the threat was realized 
when World War I brought a precipitous drop in enrollment.60 Moreover, 
depleting the cash reserve entailed the loss of annual income from the interest 
on that fund. In 1914, Ames’s successor as dean, Ezra R. Thayer, lamented the 
loss of $15,000 in annual income that previously had come from investing the 
cash spent on Langdell Hall.61
Finally, the maintenance cost on the new building increased annual 
expenses significantly. Annual “general expenses” at HLS more than doubled 
from $11,752 before Langdell Hall came on line to $25,633 afterward.62 
Concurrently, the university introduced a new policy of distributing overhead 
charges to the units,63 and HLS showed a new “University charge” in 1907–08 
of $7,165, which grew to $9,148 in 1908–09. These new factors reduced the 
annual surplus of the school from $41,351 in 1905–06 to $11,452 in 1908–09, and 
then produced a deficit of $16,262 in 1911–12, which continued thereafter. In 
56. Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 16, at 719–20.
57. Wade, supra note 24, at 8; Transcript, Austin W. Scott, Harvard Law School as it used to be 
(Nov. 15, 1964) (Harvard Law School Library Special Collections); Rawle, supra note 52, at 
186: Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 303–4.
58. Wallace B. Donham, The Graduate School of Business Administration, 1908–1929, in The 
Development of Harvard University since the Inauguration of President Eliot 1869–1929, 
534 (Samuel E. Morison ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1930).
59. Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27. A. L. Lowell, Annual Report 1911–12, 17–18 (Harvard Univ. 
1913); Bailey B. Burritt, Professional Distribution of College and University Graduates, 78 
(U.S. Office of Education 1912); McGruder E. Sadler, A Comparative Personnel Study of 
Ministerial, Medical, and Law Students 1–51 (1929) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Univ.).
60. Rawle, supra note 52, at 186.
61. Letter from Ezra R. Thayer to Mark A. D. Howe (Mar. 28, 1914) (on file with Harvard 
Law School, Dean’s Office Records, Harvard University Archives, box 1: Dean Thayer 
Correspondence Subject Files, f. University Relations 1). See The Centennial History, supra 
note 19, at 57, 107, 114–15, 119.
62. Annual Report of the Treasurer 1905–06, 10 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Annual Report of the 
Treasurer 1908–09, 12 (Harvard Univ. 1910).
63. Eliot, supra note 31, at 11–14; Eliot, supra note 8, at 58–9.
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Ames’s final year as dean—1908–09—the cash reserves of HLS had fallen from 
an amount equaling five times the annual budget to one quarter of the annual 
budget, or $31,660.64
Given the clear prospect of this financial collapse as the plans to build 
and finance Langdell Hall unfolded between 1897 and 1907, it is ironic that 
Harvard officials continued to celebrate the prosperity of HLS. In 1904, Eliot 
testified, “the law school is the most successful of the university’s professional 
[s]chools…in the relation of its receipts to its actual disbursements and its 
desirable expenditures.”65 In view of this “great prosperity,” the salaries of HLS 
professors were raised in 1904, and the president affirmed, “The pecuniary 
prosperity of the school, quite in contrast with the condition of the other 
departments of the university, made this action possible and just.”66 As late as 
1907, a history of the HLS alumni association commended the “extraordinary 
growth” of the school in various measures, including the surplus.67 Published 
in 1908, the standard scholarly history of HLS applauded “the great series 
of benefactions which have since provided so ample an endowment for the 
institution.”68 Even after retiring in 1909 and observing the deficits of the 
school, Eliot continued to maintain, “The law school is the most successful 
department of the entire university.”69
So loud and incessant was the drumbeat about the school’s prosperity 
that prominent administrators and alumni of the university continued to 
affirm it well into the next decade. When Harvard University conducted 
its first modern fundraising campaign, between 1916 and 1920, the assistant 
comptroller informed the leaders of the campaign: “The law school which, I 
understand, is going to raise some money, is easily the wealthiest department 
of the university.”70 The campaign chairman, who worked with fellow alumnus 
James Pierpont Morgan in New York, replied, “I agree with you that the 
law school, so far as I can see, doesn’t seem to need money nearly as much 
64. Annual Report of the Treasurer 1905–06, 10 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Annual Report of the 
Treasurer 1907–08, 14 (Harvard Univ. 1909); Annual Report of the Treasurer 1908–09, 12 
(Harvard Univ. 1910); Annual Report of the Treasurer 1911–12, 15–16, 132–35 (Harvard Univ. 
1913). 
65. Eliot, supra note 5, at 68.
66. Eliot, supra note 41, at 25.
67. Wade, supra note 24, at 8.
68. Charles Warren, History of the Harvard Law School, 428 (vol. 2, Lewis 1908).
69. Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Albert V. Dicey (May 2, 1913), Charles W. Eliot Papers, 
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 401).
70. Letter from Robert F. Duncan to Thomas W. Lamont, Records of Harvard Endowment 
Fund, 1916–1939 (Dec. 13, 1916), Records of Harvard Endowment Fund, 1916–1939 (Harvard 
Univ. Archives, Correspondence of Thomas W. Lamont, box 1916–1917, f. 1916).
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as the rest of the university.”71 As a result, the university campaign did not 
incorporate into its list of “urgent needs” the HLS effort to raise endowment 
funds in honor of its centennial in 1917.72
III.
Ezra R. Thayer, who became HLS dean in 1910, was apparently the first 
to comprehend and analyze the financial decline of HLS. Coming to the 
deanship from a law firm outside of HLS, he arrived unaware of the problem 
but in his second year analyzed expenses, revenue, enrollment, and tuition in 
prior decades and foresaw not only the coming deficits but also the structural 
problem in HLS finances.73 Furthermore, he realized “that the mistake about 
our wealth is widespread and I think this is an unhealthy situation.”74
Thayer then looked for ways to publicize the “poverty” of HLS to the 
Harvard community, a radical departure from the message of the prior fifteen 
years. His annual report of 1912–13 began “bringing to the public attention some 
facts about our financial condition,” although “I have had some doubt about 
the right way of publishing them because one feels some embarrassment about 
a public wail concerning the poverty of his institution.”75 He next proposed 
to the editor of the Harvard Alumni Bulletin that that periodical “might be a 
good way of bringing to the public attention some facts about our financial 
condition …. The idea that the law school needs money will no doubt surprise 
most people. The general impression is that the school is rolling in wealth. 
This is not surprising considering the record of the school…But the conditions 
which made such things possible…are now altogether changed as can easily 
be shown; and…the impression that we are so rich is not a healthy one.”76 The 
Bulletin printed Thayer’s comments, extracted from his annual report, while 
observing, “the fact that there can be any need for money [in the law school]…
will be noted with some surprise.”77
71. Letter from Thomas W. Lamont to Robert F. Duncan, Records of Harvard Endowment 
Fund, 1916–1939 (Dec. 20, 1916) (Harvard Univ. Archives, Correspondence of Thomas W. 
Lamont, box 1916-1917, f. 1916).
72. Ten Millions for Harvard, President Lowell Sets Forth the Needs of the University, reprinted 
from the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Jun. 26, 1919 (Harvard Endowment Fund Committee 
1919); Eliot Wadsworth, Campaign Book of the Harvard Endowment Fund Committee, July 
1919, Records of Harvard Endowment Fund, 1916–1939, 2–5 (Harvard University Archives, 
Correspondence of Thomas W. Lamont, box 1918–1921); The Harvard Endowment Fund, 
Harvard and the Future, 9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1919).
73. Six-page chart, Law School, Dean’s Office Records (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives, 
box 1 Dean Thayer Correspondence Subject Files, f. University Relations).
74. Letter from Ezra R. Thayer to Francis C. Huntington (Mar. 24, 1914) (Ezra Ripley Thayer 
Papers, 1882–1915, Harvard Law School Library Special Collections, box 9, f. 9–4).
75. Thayer to Howe, supra note 61. See Ezra R. Thayer, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law 
School 1912–13 (Harvard Univ. 1912).
76. Thayer to Howe, supra note 61.
77. News and Views, Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Apr. 8 1914.
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In 1915, Thayer committed suicide, setting back the effort to repair the 
finances of HLS. No dean before or after so frankly confronted the problems 
of the school’s tuition-dependent model and the imprudence of spending 
the HLS surplus while incurring new expenses.78 Thayer’s insights informed 
the HLS fundraising appeals in 1916 and 1917, even though most university 
administrators and HLS alumni remained uncomprehending due to the annual 
surpluses achieved by the school in the past. In fact, these HLS appeals even 
made explicit comparisons to show that the school’s student/faculty ratio and 
endowment/student ratio were much worse than at other Harvard schools.79 
Celebrations had become confessions. But HLS attracted little sympathy, and 
its centennial campaign raised barely a quarter of the goal of $1.1 million.80
Yet, greater than either the irony that HLS collapsed financially while 
Eliot, Ames, and the faculty and alumni continued to think of it as Harvard’s 
most successful professional school, or the irony that HLS failed to recover 
financially during the 1910s because it was widely viewed as prosperous, 
was the irony that HLS impoverished itself by violating the fundamental 
financial policies of President Eliot. It was Eliot who laid the foundation 
for Harvard’s subsequent financial preeminence by positing and instituting 
several path-breaking policies during his administration from 1869 to 1909. 
Eliot embedded these policies in his thiry-nine annual reports, which he wrote 
with the intention to explain not only the affairs of Harvard University, but 
also the best way to run a university.81
One of his cardinal policies was that universities ought “to spend every year 
all their income”82 and never carry over a surplus from a given year. In fact, 
Eliot maintained, “it is not possible to avoid occasional deficits,” because “to 
avoid deficits invariably would mean to aim deliberately at an annual surplus, 
and to keep sufficient reserves to guarantee that annual surplus. This cautious 
policy, which is appropriate to an industrial or commercial establishment, the 
78. Thayer to Howe, supra note 61. Thayer observed about HLS in the 1890s: “[T]he students 
were packed in Austin Hall, which was no where nearly large enough to give them proper 
accommodations, and the classes handled by a single teacher grew to be...a good deal larger 
than they should have been.”
79. William Caleb Loring, James Byrne, and William C. Osborn, To the Graduates of the 
Harvard Law School (Harvard Law School Library Special Collections 1917); Rawle, supra 
note 52, at 186; The Centennial History, supra note 19, at 170–73.
80. Roscoe Pound, The Law School, in The Harvard Endowment Fund, Harvard and the 
Future, 12–13 (Harvard Univ. Press 1919). The total raised in the HLS centennial campaign 
does not appear to be recorded in any records identified thus far. But that no more than 
$250,000 could have been raised can be inferred from [List of] “$10,000 and Over [Gifts] 
Endowment Fund,” [c. late 1920] and [List of] “Subscribers who have pledges $25,000.00 
and Over, September 10, 1920. Corrected to Nov. 1920,” both in Harvard Endowment Fund 
Committee, Records of Harvard Endowment Fund, 1916–39 (Harvard Univ. Archives, box 
“Lists, reports, statistics, etc.” 1919–25, f. Various Statistics).
81. Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Charles F. Thwing (Feb. 17 & 28, 1898) (Charles F. Thwing 
Papers, Case Western Reserve Univ. Library Special Collections, box 5, f. 1).
82. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1882–82, 41 (Harvard Univ. 1883).
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president and Fellows [of the Corporation] think not to be the best in an 
educational and charitable institution.”83 The supposed profligacy of Eliot’s 
policy of deficit spending has been criticized in at least one prominent analysis 
without appreciating that Eliot’s purpose was to justify the institution’s need 
for gifts.84 As he wrote to the president of Johns Hopkins University in 1887, 
“So long as the community sees that the trustees [of Johns Hopkins] can and 
do build out of income…new endowments will be somewhat improbable…. Is 
it not time to mortgage—so to speak—your whole income, as we do at Harvard? 
A man who can build a good home without touching his principal is sure to 
be counted rich.”85
Another of Eliot’s fundamental policies was to avoid dependence on 
tuition and instead to build a large endowment of invested funds, preferably 
unrestricted. “The law of supply and demand…never has worked well in the 
province of high education,” asserted Eliot in his inaugural address of 1869.86 
He related this policy particularly to the faculty of arts and sciences, but it was 
no less true that “a professional school of high grade ought not to depend on 
tuition fees…. In law schools, as in other educational institutions, it is only 
the elementary instruction, given year after year to large classes, which can be 
self-supporting.”87
Recognizing that donors rarely give unrestricted endowment funds, leaving 
full discretion to university authorities to spend the income, Eliot repeatedly 
announced a third guideline: “There is no more desirable gift to a university 
than a fund to endow a professorship.”88 The reason that “of all university 
endowments the most fundamental and permanently valuable are endowed 
professorships”89 is that such a gift “sets free resources now used to meet those 
charges” for salary.90 In a sense, endowment for a professorship is fungible, 
since salaries have to be paid one way or another. Hence, “whoever endows 
one of the…professorships which have no endowment” and “whoever gives an 
unrestricted fund contributes by its full amount to the same end.”91
Another cardinal financial policy was not to fund the construction of 
buildings out of university resources because, on the one hand, “experience 
83. Eliot, supra note 13, at 53.
84. Seymour E. Harris, Economics of Harvard (McGraw-Hill 1970) (repeatedly criticizes Eliot 
on this point).
85. Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Daniel C. Gilman (Oct. 29, 1887) (Daniel Coit Gilman 
Papers, Johns Hopkins Univ. Library Special Collections, Ms. 1).
86. Charles W. Eliot, Inaugural Address, reprinted in A Turning Point in Higher Education, 20 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1969).
87. Eliot, supra note 22, at 13.
88. Eliot, Annual Report 1906–07, 38.
89. Eliot, supra note 31, at 61.
90. Eliot, Annual Report 1883–84, supra note 19, at 44.
91. Id.
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has shown that new buildings will be provided by gift nearly as fast as they 
are needed.”92 On the other hand, experience also showed that “as fast as new 
resources are placed in their hands…the Corporation incur new permanent 
charges.” Gifts, in fact, are expensive and buildings more so, because 
“enlargements, improvements, and repairs fall upon the Corporation.”93 
Mindful of this problem of paying for the maintenance of buildings received 
as gifts, Eliot announced a new policy in 1903 that Harvard would not accept 
any gift for a building without an accompanying endowment to pay for its 
maintenance.94
Those five policies culminated in a sixth: Harvard always needed more 
gifts. Eliot’s consistent approach was to identify more needs and point to the 
limitations of resources. When acknowledging that “the total endowment of 
the university continues to increase,” Eliot unfailingly observed, “nevertheless, 
many urgent needs weigh upon the minds of the faculties and the governing 
boards.”95 Even while gratefully recognizing enormous gifts, the president was 
utterly shameless in asking for more in the next breath: “It may seem strange 
to urge the need of further endowments immediately after the receipt of the 
large…Endowment Fund; but the fact is that…the income of that fund is not 
applicable to charges already incurred, or to any expansions of the work of the 
College.”96
Given his insistence on applying these six policies to all other sectors of 
Harvard, it is ironic not only that HLS—the most successful professional school—
violated them, but did so with Eliot’s concurrence and even encouragement. 
As noted above, HLS began accumulating an annual surplus in 1887, and Eliot 
and others publicized it and crowed about the school’s “prosperity.” No other 
unit of Harvard received this treatment in the 2,700 pages of Eliot’s annual 
reports. Before HLS began accumulating its large surplus, the president urged 
the school to escape dependence on tuition and seek gifts for endowment, as 
prescribed by his general policies. Shortly after Dean Langdell arrived in 1870, 
Eliot emphasized that “the law school is very inadequately endowed, and is 
therefore somewhat dependent…upon the number of its students. It is this 
deplorable dependence which debases so many of the professional schools 
of this country.”97 In 1878 Langdell concurred, and in 1880 Eliot repeated, 
“the endowment of the law school is deplorably small.”98 In the mid-1880s 
92. Eliot, Annual Report 1882–83, 41 (Harvard Univ. 1884).
93. Eliot, supra note 82, at 42.
94. Eliot, supra note 13, at 25.
95. Eliot, Annual Report, 1900–01, 49–50 (Harvard Univ. 1902).
96. Eliot, supra note 8, at 24.
97. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1871–72, 21–22 (Harvard Univ.1873). See Charles W. Eliot, 
Annual Report 1872–73, 17, 30–31 (Harvard Univ. 1874).
98. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1878–79, 28 (Harvard Univ. 1880). See C. C. Langdell, 
Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1876–77, 91 (Harvard Univ. 1878).
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the president stated, typically, “it is to be hoped, that the legal profession 
and the community are beginning to perceive the importance of endowing 
professional as well as college education.”99
However, after the three gifts of Austin Hall, the professorship, and the 
book fund arrived in the early 1880s and the annual surpluses began to appear 
in the late 1880s, Eliot ceased lamenting the law school’s tuition dependence 
and small endowment though he continued doing so for every other unit at 
Harvard. For HLS, he began to observe instead that the “surpluses…will be 
available for use in any period of temporary depression.”100 Regarding another 
Harvard department, Eliot stated in 1906 his customary injunction that “it is 
very desirable to diminish the dependence…on the receipts from students.” 
But, a few pages later, he observed that “the extraordinary prosperity of the 
law school continued during the year 1904–05, the number of students being 
larger than ever.”101 HLS was apparently exempt from Eliot’s policies and 
could depend on tuition.
The dean, the faculty, and the Overseers Visiting Committee of HLS did 
not agree. In a major address at the American Bar Association in 1895, HLS 
Professor James B. Thayer maintained, “Our law schools must be endowed as 
our colleges are endowed. If they are not, then the managers must needs consult 
[sic] the market, and…bid for numbers of students instead of excellence of 
work.”102 In the late 1890s, as HLS became overcrowded, Dean Ames and 
the Overseers Visiting Committee expressed “regret that a large portion of 
the surplus earnings of the school should be used for no better purpose than 
an extensive enlargement of the building.”103 Instead, they requested in 1898 
that the surplus be moved into an endowment for a professorship honoring 
Langdell, partly to preserve the money and also because “the appearance in 
the Treasurer’s Report of a surplus fund…would be a serious obstacle to…
raising the money for the addition to Austin Hall by contributions from the 
alumni of the school.”104 Although this request was entirely consistent with the 
view that Eliot had pressed on the president of Johns Hopkins University and 
everyone else over the previous three decades, he and the corporation balked, 
saying that “it would be more complimentary to Langdell if the alumni of 
the law school should contribute…a Langdell professorship rather than a 
means of extending Austin Hall.” More generally, they opposed “reducing the 
99. Eliot, Annual Report 1881–82, supra note 20, at 30. See Eliot, Annual Report 1883–84, supra 
note 19, at 34; Eliot, Annual Report 1885–86, supra note 22, at 13.
100. Eliot, Annual Report 1894–95, supra note 26, at 27.
101. Eliot, supra note 8, at 14, 39.
102. James B. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 184 
(1895).
103. Ames, Annual Report 1896–97, supra note 34, at 164. See Ames, Annual Report 1897–98, supra 
note 34, at 166–67; Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 34, at 527–28.
104. Letter from James B. Ames to Charles W. Eliot (Jan. 31, 1898) (Charles W. Eliot Papers, 
Harvard Univ. Archives, box 100).
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surplus of the law school by making a specific appropriation of a large part 
of it” because “the entire fund is now disposable, principal and interest.”105 
This response seemed to directly contradict Eliot’s emphatic policies about 
avoiding a surplus, increasing endowment, endowing professorships, and 
financing buildings.
In March 1898, Ames and faculty countered by asking that $100,000 of 
the surplus be transferred into a professorship or an endowment for the 
library,106 and a month later the Overseers Visiting Committee asserted that 
“the endowment of the law school is very moderate” and urged that “as large 
a portion as possible of the existing surplus [be] devoted to the endowment of 
additional professorships.”107 Nevertheless, in May 1898, the corporation voted 
to move only $100,000 of the surplus into a new law School Library Fund, “the 
income of which shall, until further order of the Corporation, be applied towards the 
administration expenses of the law library.”108 Although this move may have 
wisely recognized that donors were less inclined to support “administration” 
than a building or a professorship, the designated library fund was still a cash 
reserve, not a sacrosanct endowment. Furthermore, Eliot’s reports made no 
announcement about needs of the school. Then, while the surplus grew by 
tens of thousands of dollars each year between 1898 and 1907, the corporation 
created a Langdell professorship but did not endow it, and the salary was paid 
by the current revenues of the school.109 In 1903, Eliot stated even more baldly 
and publicly that the annual surpluses of HLS “can be accumulated to cover 
the extra cost of the new building.”110 HLS was still the only unit at Harvard 
that had enough money to meet its needs by Eliot’s account, and his annual 
reports did not make appeals on behalf of the school.
Meanwhile, no one associated with HLS seems to have made any effort to 
raise money, as the ambivalent planning to increase the space went forward 
in the early 1900s. In 1897, Dean Ames and the faculty discussed “raising the 
money for the addition to Austin Hall,”111 but none of their annual reports, 
meeting minutes, or extant correspondence indicate any action taken 
subsequently. Nor did the alumni association help.
105. Letter from Charles W. Eliot to James B. Ames (Feb. 1898), Charles W. Eliot Papers (Harvard 
Univ. Archives, shorthand box 317, legal Pad 28/98–10/98, 6p. from end).
106. HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Mar. 17, 1898; Letter from James B. Ames to Edward Hooper 
(Mar. 18, 1898), Charles W. Eliot Papers (Harvard Univ. Archives, box 266–267).
107. Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 34, at 528.
108. Harvard Univ. Corporation, at May 9, 1898 (Corporation Records, Harvard Univ. Archives); 
Annual Report of the Treasurer 1897–98, 38, 74–75 (Harvard Univ. 1899) (emphasis added).
109. Letter from James B. Ames to Charles W. Eliot (Dec. 30, 1902), Charles W. Eliot Papers 
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 100); Harvard University Corporation, supra note 108, at Apr. 
27, 1903.
110. Eliot, supra note 31, at 44.
111. Ames to Eliot, supra note 104.
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Founded in 1886, the Harvard Law School Association (HLSA) was 
created “to advance the cause of legal education and to promote the interests 
and increase the usefulness of the Harvard Law School.”112 Over the next 
two decades HLSA spent $17,375 on its own organization, publications and 
meetings, while contributing $7,231 to the school for portraits, prizes, and 
lectures and another $1,649 to the Harvard Law Review.113 While the crisis and 
debate about the surplus and overcrowding of their alma mater unfolded 
between 1897 and 1907, the alumni contentedly observed that “the life of the 
association…was unmarked by any important or striking event.”114 At the same 
time, HLSA was accumulating its own surplus of nearly $12,000 and, unable 
to decide how to spend it, commissioned portraits of two senior faculty in 
1905 and offered to equip the reading room in the extension of Austin Hall. 
HLSA then canceled those gifts when the decision was made to build Langdell 
Hall.115 In 1907, epitomizing the tone of self-congratulation surrounding the 
school, the HLSA officers extolled their association for fulfilling its purpose, 
demonstrated by “the extraordinary growth of the Harvard Law School during 
the [twenty] years of the life of the law school association.”116 This correlation 
demonstrated the causal role of HLSA, in their view. In 1910, as Dean Thayer 
began to grapple with the financial collapse of the school, the HLSA president 
“congratulate[d] the association on its continued success and prosperity” and 
on its capacity “in some degree at least, to fulfill its proper function of being of 
practical benefit and assistance to the law school.”117
The failure of the dean, faculty, and alumni at HLS to obtain or even seek 
gifts is all the more surprising given that HLS was surrounded by this activity. 
Many professors, administrators, and “friends” of other units at Harvard were 
approaching donors, following up on the needs identified in Eliot’s annual 
reports. In 1900, for example, the philosophy faculty drew up a detailed plan, 
publicized it in Harvard publications, and successfully solicited funds for 
a new building for their department, which was completed early in 1906.118 
Such efforts throughout the university produced “a remarkable inflowing of 
112. Harvard Law School Association, Report of the Organization and of the First General 
Meeting, 1886, 10 (Harvard Law School Association 1887).
113. Wade, supra note 24, at 7–8. In 1905 HLS alumnus James C. Carter died and left a bequest of 
$100,000 to endow a professorship at HLS. Eliot, supra note 4, at 52–53. This gift did not result 
from a solicitation to Carter, who had earlier expressed “persistent and uncompromising” 
opposition to explicit fundraising efforts. Letter from John O. Sargent to James B. Thayer 
(Apr. 15, 1882) (James B. Thayer Papers, Harvard Law School Library Special Collections, 
box 20).
114. Wade, supra note 24, at 7.
115. Id. at 7-8.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Francis J. Swayze, Address, in Harvard Law School Association, Sixth Celebration and 
Dinner, 29–32, 37 (Harvard Law School Association 1910).
118. Eliot, supra note 95, at 36–37; Eliot, supra note 4, at 34.
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gifts for several years past,” Eliot remarked in January 1907.119 Meanwhile, as 
HLSA was congratulating itself on having provided an average of $360 a year 
to its alma mater, the Harvard College 25th-year reunion class in 1904 initiated 
the practice of donating $100,000 to the university at each commencement.120 
Outside of Harvard, Dean Francis Wayland of Yale Law School succeeded 
in raising $38,000 to complete its law building and $150,000 for endowment 
by the time he retired in 1903.121 At Columbia University, $500,000 was raised 
between 1905 and 1910 for a new building for its law school.122
In contrast, the dean, the faculty, and the alumni of HLS simply capitulated, 
as the HLS Centennial History noted in 1918: “[A]lthough…the faculty cherished 
these higher ideals…it was plain that…if the only way to get the building 
was through sacrifice of the higher ideals…the pursuit of those ideals must be 
left to some other institution better endowed…. So Langdell Hall was built, 
and the school’s surplus spent in the undertaking.”123 Indeed, the fact that 
the whole project was tailored to the surplus is shown by the construction 
of only three-fifths of the building, at a cost of $400,000, the amount of the 
available surplus. No effort was made to seek donations even to supplement 
the school’s contribution, although Ames and the faculty “prefer to have the 
whole building put up at once.”124
Within Harvard, the decline in the law school’s standing, as a result of these 
financial developments, appears clearly in comparison to Harvard Medical 
School (HMS), which rose from straggling behind HLS in 1895 to eclipsing it 
by 1910. From the outset of his presidency, Eliot warned HMS against tuition 
dependency and maintained, “no department of the university needs a large 
endowment more than the medical school, or better deserves one, and there 
is no department of the university in which the good to be done by a liberal 
endowment would be more direct, immediate, diffusive, and lasting.”125 During 
the next thirty years, he repeated this theme in lengthy paragraphs, while 
calling for endowed medical professorships and gifts for medical facilities.126 
By 1900 gifts had accumulated to about $1 million, and then, in response to 
“the prophetic insight and the zeal of a few of the university’s teachers of 
119. Eliot, supra note 4, at 56–57.
120. Eliot, supra note 13, at 41; William Lawrence, Memories of A Happy Life, 228 (Houghton 
Mifflin 1926); Eliot, supra note 4, at 53–54.
121. Hicks, supra note 30, at 210–15; Kelley, supra note 30, at 276–77, 340–41.
122. Goebel, supra note 29, at 185–86.
123. The Centennial History, supra note 19, at 119.
124. Lowell to Adams, supra note 43.
125. Eliot, Annual Report 1872–73, supra note 97, at 33–34.
126. Eliot, Annual Report 1871–72, supra note 97, at 25–26; Eliot, Annual Report 1880–81, supra 
note 19, at 29–30; Eliot, supra note 92, at 30; Eliot, Annual Report 1883–84, supra note 19, at 
36; Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1888–89, 22–23 (Harvard Univ. 1890); Charles W. Eliot, 
Annual Report 1897–98, 37 (Harvard Univ. 1899).
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medicine,”127 an avalanche of nearly $4 million was promised during 1900 and 
1901 in order to build five major buildings, endow professorships, and support 
maintenance and equipment for the buildings.128
Due to this munificence, “the medical school now has a larger endowment 
than any other professional department of the university,” Eliot observed 
in January 1902, “This fact is the more striking, because [thirty] years ago 
it had the smallest endowment among the professional departments.”129 But 
this prosperity did not deter Eliot from asking for more, in keeping with the 
cardinal financial policies that he consistently applied to HMS. In January 
1907 he wrote, “the [medical] buildings and the permanent funds which 
accompanied them constitute the largest single addition to the resources of 
the university…since it received its charter in 1650…but it is already plain 
that…additional endowment will be indispensable.”130 At that point, HMS 
was wealthy but had insatiable needs, while HLS was exhausting its reserves 
but needed nothing. The transposition of the two schools is exemplified by 
the contrast between the two-day celebration held to dedicate the five medical 
buildings in September 1906,131 in contrast to the failed effort to dedicate the 
three-fifths of Langdell Hall at its opening one year later. When appealing 
for funds in recognition of its centennial in 1917, HLS therefore compared its 
financial situation with that of the medical school, though it also had relatively 
fewer resources than the divinity school, the business school, or the arts and 
sciences.132
IV.
It is difficult to explain the underlying causes or the thinking of the 
individuals involved in the financial collapse of HLS during the administration 
of Dean Ames. One is almost tempted to suggest that Eliot was trying to 
validate his policies by showing that a preeminent institution could come to 
ruin by violating them. But less perverse reasons may also be posited.
During his administration from 1870 to 1895, Dean Langdell had instituted 
a new financial strategy for HLS, and professional education in general, by 
turning upside down the traditional thinking that low standards and low 
tuition were necessary in order to attract students and secure sufficient revenue. 
With Eliot’s support, Langdell argued that raising academic standards would 
make the school’s degree more valuable and marketable, attracting more and 
stronger students; and this new approach succeeded spectacularly, after an 
127. Eliot, supra note 4, at 28.
128. Eliot, supra note 31, at, 26, 32–37; Thomas F. Harrington, The Harvard Medical School, 1192 
(v. 3, Lewis 1905).
129. Eliot, supra note 95, at 49–50.
130. Eliot, supra note 4, at 28.
131. Id. at 27–29.
132. Loring, supra note 79; Rawle, supra note 52, at 186; The Centennial History, supra note 19, at 
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initial decline in enrollment and revenue during the late 1870s.133 That decline, 
and the institution of the new model, were financed by building a surplus in 
the mid-1870s and then paying out the cash reserves when the deficits occurred 
in the following years.134 A few years later, that early surplus also allowed the 
school to furnish Austin Hall after it was built, even though enrollment had 
not fully recovered.135 Consequently, Eliot may have supported and encouraged 
spending the surplus to build Langdell Hall because he believed that this 
tactic simply repeated the pattern of the 1870s on a larger scale, although he 
never said so. Furthermore, he may have felt that legal education would always 
be highly profitable because it did not “need costly equipment, and a great 
amount of instruction addressed to the individual,”136 though he recognized 
that the expense of sustaining the HLS library was very high and might 
become prohibitive.137
Another explanation for the financial collapse might be the self-satisfaction, 
or pride, of those associated with HLS, who may have believed that the school 
was simply too successful to fail. The faculty were likely surprised that “no 
benefactor came forward to present the new building,” or that “the Corporation 
did not think fit to provide more accommodations out of the general funds.”138 
Upon assuming the deanship in 1910, Thayer did not yet understand the 
financial problems, but he already sensed the atmosphere of complacent self-
satisfaction, because he warned in his first address to the alumni association: 
“[W]e cannot afford, however strong may be the professional temptation, to 
rejoice in past triumphs,…congratulating ourselves on what has been done 
in the past. Our faces would then be turned in the wrong direction. The 
Harvard Law School cannot keep its present position by resting upon its past 
achievements.”139 Appropriately, Thayer was speaking at the annual dinner of 
the alumni association, which gave itself far too much credit for very little 
effort or contribution.
Whether due to pride or complacency, it is clear that HLS stagnated 
administratively. Under Ames, the school “ran smoothly in the groove started 
by Langdell. There were no marked differences of opinion.” The faculty 
offered no innovations, for “there was rarely any discussion,” and the dean’s 
“recommendations were habitually accepted.”140 In fact, the floor plan for the 
new Langdell Hall followed closely that of Austin Hall built in 1883 under 
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134. C. C. Langdell, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1875–76, 28 (Harvard Univ. 
1877).; Eliot, Annual Report 1878–79, supra note 98, at 27–28.
135. Eliot, Annual Report 1883–84, supra note 19, at 35. 
136. Eliot, Annual Report 1893–94, 19 (Harvard Univ. 1895).
137. Eliot, supra note 36, at 17–18.
138. The Centennial History, supra note 19, at 57, 107.
139. Ezra R. Thayer, Address, in Harvard Law School Association, Sixth Celebration and Dinner, 
39 (Harvard Law School Association 1910).
140. Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography, 187 (Little, Brown 1941).
27
Langdell: Small number of large classrooms, no seminar rooms, library on 
the second floor, faculty offices in the stacks. Furthermore, against Eliot’s 
preference, the HLS faculty decided to persevere in Langdell’s narrow view of 
law, “limiting the instruction given in that school to law determined by courts. 
They therefore would not admit to the school such studies as institutional 
history, government, political science, and administration national, state, 
municipal, or colonial. The demand for instruction in these subjects at 
universities is manifestly increasing; but…will have to be developed in the 
graduate school.”141 The HLS faculty thus ceded vast tracts of academic and 
curricular territory due to a longstanding commitment to the purity of their 
field.
Dean Ames was personally content to remain in Langdell’s groove. His 
brief annual reports rarely addressed new issues and primarily updated with 
new data the tables that Langdell had developed concerning “the courses of 
study and instruction during the year, the text-books used, the number of 
exercises per week in each course, and the number of students who offered 
themselves for examination.”142 Nine years into his tenure, Ames observed to 
the HLSA “how solidly the new foundations of the law school were laid during 
[Langdell’s] administration…. His originality and his far-sighted sagacity…
still dominate[] the conduct of the school. For this reason, I have very little 
to report to you that is new.”143 At points, as the overcrowding and financial 
crises loomed, even the Overseers Visiting Committee became impatient 
with Ames’s docility, making an unprecedented reprimand when describing 
his annual report as “on the whole, a decided understatement of the school’s 
immediate needs.”144
Ames’s decanal stagnation stemmed, in part, from administrative ineptitude. 
He refused to surrender any detail of administration to a secretary, and wrote 
out all his letters longhand to be copied on the typewriter.145 Though much 
beloved, he was apparently unable to analyze matters strategically and chart 
an effective course of action. Hence, he continued in the old ways. His 
scholarship had a strongly esoteric flavor, importing long out-dated English 
doctrine into modern controversies.146 Even in his field of expertise—negotiable 
paper—Ames was not consulted when the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law was drafted during the 1890s, and he did not see it until the new law had 
been adopted by four states, a fact demonstrating his total detachment from 
actual legislation and practice of his time. The strong technical objections 
that he later published about the law reflected “his slender experience with 
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the practical business of legislation” and lack “of practical contact with the 
world of affairs.” As a result, Ames’s technical critique was largely ignored, 
and litigation rarely arose over the supposed defects that he identified.147
In 1907, when Ames expressed interest in assuming a named professorship 
in jurisprudence at HLS, Eliot asked him, “Should you advise the faculty to 
have a new dean more directly connected with the training of practitioners, or 
should you be willing to continue to be dean?…You will correctly infer from 
these questions that I have been turning the matter over in my mind lately, 
and feel the need of conference with you.”148 Since HLS professors commonly 
moved among the named professorships without changing their roles or 
duties, as did Langdell, Eliot would scarcely have asked this question if he 
were entirely satisfied with Ames’s administration. Ames decided to forego the 
professorship and remain as dean.
Ames’s decanal stagnation also stemmed from his exhausting workload, 
which certainly contributed to his early death. Students observed that “the 
dean doesn’t walk, he always runs, seeming to be in eternal haste. He never 
goes up stairs without taking at least two steps at a jump.”149 In the absence of 
any institutional strategy, he primarily responded to the overcrowding crisis by 
heroically assuming more teaching himself, and his annual reports reveal that 
he taught as many, or more, courses than any other faculty member, while also 
serving as dean. During his last full academic year in 1908–09, Ames taught 
five courses with enrollments of 268, 231, 145, 6, and 2 students. In fall 1909, 
he began to have a nervous breakdown, suffering some aphasia and amnesia. 
In November, he took a leave of absence and died in January 1910 at the age 
of 64.150
Meanwhile, Eliot retired in June 1909 after forty years as president. During 
his final decade, critics had begun to argue that he over-emphasized professional 
education and funneled too many resources to Harvard’s professional schools 
while neglecting the undergraduate college. After the medical school received 
its enormous gifts in the early 1900s, Eliot himself began to worry in 1904 
that such a large proportion of the university’s endowment was restricted 
to the professional schools.151 Consequently, Eliot may have refrained from 
including HLS among his annual narrative of Harvard’s needs both because 
the law school exemplified Eliot’s commitment to professional education 
and because he wondered whether that commitment was unbalancing the 
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university’s resources. In a sense, HLS was “too successful” to need money, 
and Eliot was unwilling to promote its needs, having extolled its wealth and 
accomplishments.
Whatever the explanation, it took decades for HLS to recover from the 
financial collapse under Dean Ames. The sudden death of Dean Thayer, the 
lack of university support for the 1917 centennial campaign, and the steep 
drop in enrollments during World War I prevented any rapid recovery. Eliot’s 
successor, President A. Lawrence Lowell, though an alumnus of HLS, took 
far more interest in the Graduate School of Business Administration, and the 
university did little to support another unsuccessful fundraising campaign by 
HLS in the mid-1920s. Consequently, the school had to borrow a $1.5 million 
from the university to finish construction of Langdell Hall in 1929. The Great 
Depression followed, and in 1936, when James Landis succeeded Roscoe 
Pound as dean, HLS was still financially weak and received not a single 
endowed professorship during the 1930s.152
When Erwin Griswold became dean in 1946, he found that HLS “had ‘a 
great reputation’ and ‘a superb library,’ but was ‘unbelievably poor,’ with a 
large mortgage on its major building, Langdell Hall; inadequate dormitory 
accommodations and no dining facilities; a faculty that once had been 
distinguished, a student-faculty ratio of more than 50 to 1; and bad-to-
nonexistent alumni relations.”153 By that point, the once unrivaled leadership 
of HLS had declined to primus inter pares at best, as other leading university law 
schools, especially at Yale and Columbia, had caught, if not surpassed, “the 
greatest law school in the world.”
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